Iwo Jima - D-Day to D+10
All of the daily summaries for the Iwo Jima campaign are from the website http://iwojimahistory.com by Ray Backstrom.
(D Day) 19 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Clear and mild; sea calm.
CT 26 (less LT 126, released to 5thMarDiv and subsequently attached to CT 27) commenced pre-boating of vehicles and heavy equipment at 0750, completed about 1045. At 1000 CT 26 was released by VAC and became 5thMarDiv reserve. Upon receipt of orders to boat and proceed to Line of Departure at about 1100, general debarkation was commenced. C) and advance reconnaissance parties proceeded to the TRANSDIV control vessel and opened forward CP there. At about 1530 orders were received to land and assemble ashore. Between 1600 and 1715 advance reconnaissance parties, LT 326 Boat Group and LT 226 Boat Group landed on Beach RED-1 and commenced organizing perimeter defense in vicinity of 148F. About 1800, on order of ADC in conference with CO CT 26 and CO CT 27, dispositions were shifted.
Although no direct contact with the enemy was made, sporadic artillery and mortar fire was received throughout the area on this date, and for the next ten days, falling with great accuracy into the battalion CPs and other forward establishments. Due to adverse beach conditions no vehicles were able to get off the beach on this date.
Effective strength: 146 Off, 3110 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team's assault troops met light resistance from enemy infantry troops on the beach, but found the beach area being hit repeatedly by enemy mortar and artillery fire. Our CP was under almost constant artillery and mortar fire during the afternoon and night. Enemy documents found in T.S. 148J indicated that the 311th Independent Infantry battalion was on the island. A small number of enemy dead was found in the beach areas. At 1400, our left battalion reported 100 dead in their zone of action.
The enemy dead reported on D-Day was 100.
This combat team's assault troops met light resistance from enemy infantry troops on the beach, but found the beach area being hit repeatedly by enemy mortar and artillery fire. Our CP was under almost constant artillery and mortar fire during the afternoon and night. Enemy documents found in T.S. 148J indicated that the 311th Independent Infantry battalion was on the island. A small number of enemy dead was found in the beach areas. At 1400, our left battalion reported 100 dead in their zone of action. The enemy dead reported on D-Day was 100.
28th Marines
CT-28 (less LT 328) landed on beach GREEN-1 at 0902, LT-128 in assault. Covering naval gunfire and air bombardment enabled the assault waves to land and clear the beach rapidly with moderate casualties. The assault waves were preceded by a wave of 11 LVT (A)s which upon landing took positions on the left flank of the beach and protected the incoming waves by firing on enemy positions at the base of SURIBACHI.
LT-228 landed at 0935 and went into position facing south on the line R-A. By this time mortar and small arms fire was increasing on the beach. Colonel Liversedge and the advance echelon of the Combat Team CP landed with the 10th wave and established the CP in 147 Y. At 1035, Lt. Frank Wright of B Co, LT-128, and a few men reached the west side of the island. In it's rapid advance across the island, LT-128 had become disorganized, and at this time it was clear that another landing team would have to be committed on the right of LT-228 in order to launch an attack south to seize Mt. Suribachi. Consequently, at 1039, LT-328 was released to CT-28 control, and ordered to land at 1210. When LT-328 landed there was a marked increase in enemy mortar and small arms fire and many casualties were suffered in crossing the beach.
A patrol, with radio, from the R-2 Section operated on the right flank of CT-28 during the advance across the island with mission of reporting contact between CT-28 and CT-27. Contact was maintained until the high north-south ridge-line was reached and CT-27 turned north in its attack up the island. C Co, 5th Tank Bn, was ordered to land on beach RED-1 at 1145. Upon landing the tanks were attached to LT-128 and assisted in mopping up behind LT-128 and knocked out enemy emplacements that were holding up its advance. Five tanks were put out of action by mines on the third terrace inland from GREEN-1.
The 75mm Plat, Regimental Weapons Co, in the 6th wave lost one halftrack as it was leaving the LCM. The front wheels became enmeshed in barbed wire laid just below the water line. Attempts to putt the halftrack out were unsuccessful and it was lost for the remainder of the operation. The remainder of the halftracks moved to the left flank of GREEN-1 and delivered heavy fire on pillboxes and caves from which intense mortar and small arms fire was being delivered into the exposed left flank of the Combat Team.
The two 37mm Plats attached to LT-128 and LT-228 succeeded in crossing the beach although one gun and weasel were lost debarking from the LCM and one gun and weasel were destroyed by mortar fire on the beach. No wheeled vehicles were able to cross the beach. They mired in the soft sand and became easy targets for mortar fire. The Rocket Detachment attached to CT-28 lost three trucks on the beach before being able to launch a single rocket. The one remaining rocket truck fired several barrages on the base and north side of SURIBACHI.
From 1100 to 1600, E Co. was attached to LT-128 and assisted in mopping up by-passed enemy positions. At 1600, E Co. returned to Combat Team Reserve. At 1545 LT-228 and LT-328 were ordered to attack south and seize SURIBACHI. Negligible advances were made against strong opposition.
Captain Mears, commanding B Co. and Captain Roach, commanding C Co, were severely wounded and evacuated during LT-128's advance across the island. The Combat Team CP moved to 147S northwest at 1800. LT-128 CP at 147R east. LT-228 CP at 147W northeast. LT-328 CP at 147Y center. Front lines at close of period were on R-A, 132 I center, 147 P southeast, 147 G center.
At the close of D-day it was thought that casualties were much more severe than was actually the case. LT-128 alone reported 600 missing. However many of these men had returned by D+2. They had been fighting with other companies and in some cases other regiments.
Combat efficiency: 85%
26th Marines
Weather: Clear and mild; sea calm.
CT 26 (less LT 126, released to 5thMarDiv and subsequently attached to CT 27) commenced pre-boating of vehicles and heavy equipment at 0750, completed about 1045. At 1000 CT 26 was released by VAC and became 5thMarDiv reserve. Upon receipt of orders to boat and proceed to Line of Departure at about 1100, general debarkation was commenced. C) and advance reconnaissance parties proceeded to the TRANSDIV control vessel and opened forward CP there. At about 1530 orders were received to land and assemble ashore. Between 1600 and 1715 advance reconnaissance parties, LT 326 Boat Group and LT 226 Boat Group landed on Beach RED-1 and commenced organizing perimeter defense in vicinity of 148F. About 1800, on order of ADC in conference with CO CT 26 and CO CT 27, dispositions were shifted.
Although no direct contact with the enemy was made, sporadic artillery and mortar fire was received throughout the area on this date, and for the next ten days, falling with great accuracy into the battalion CPs and other forward establishments. Due to adverse beach conditions no vehicles were able to get off the beach on this date.
Effective strength: 146 Off, 3110 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team's assault troops met light resistance from enemy infantry troops on the beach, but found the beach area being hit repeatedly by enemy mortar and artillery fire. Our CP was under almost constant artillery and mortar fire during the afternoon and night. Enemy documents found in T.S. 148J indicated that the 311th Independent Infantry battalion was on the island. A small number of enemy dead was found in the beach areas. At 1400, our left battalion reported 100 dead in their zone of action.
The enemy dead reported on D-Day was 100.
This combat team's assault troops met light resistance from enemy infantry troops on the beach, but found the beach area being hit repeatedly by enemy mortar and artillery fire. Our CP was under almost constant artillery and mortar fire during the afternoon and night. Enemy documents found in T.S. 148J indicated that the 311th Independent Infantry battalion was on the island. A small number of enemy dead was found in the beach areas. At 1400, our left battalion reported 100 dead in their zone of action. The enemy dead reported on D-Day was 100.
28th Marines
CT-28 (less LT 328) landed on beach GREEN-1 at 0902, LT-128 in assault. Covering naval gunfire and air bombardment enabled the assault waves to land and clear the beach rapidly with moderate casualties. The assault waves were preceded by a wave of 11 LVT (A)s which upon landing took positions on the left flank of the beach and protected the incoming waves by firing on enemy positions at the base of SURIBACHI.
LT-228 landed at 0935 and went into position facing south on the line R-A. By this time mortar and small arms fire was increasing on the beach. Colonel Liversedge and the advance echelon of the Combat Team CP landed with the 10th wave and established the CP in 147 Y. At 1035, Lt. Frank Wright of B Co, LT-128, and a few men reached the west side of the island. In it's rapid advance across the island, LT-128 had become disorganized, and at this time it was clear that another landing team would have to be committed on the right of LT-228 in order to launch an attack south to seize Mt. Suribachi. Consequently, at 1039, LT-328 was released to CT-28 control, and ordered to land at 1210. When LT-328 landed there was a marked increase in enemy mortar and small arms fire and many casualties were suffered in crossing the beach.
A patrol, with radio, from the R-2 Section operated on the right flank of CT-28 during the advance across the island with mission of reporting contact between CT-28 and CT-27. Contact was maintained until the high north-south ridge-line was reached and CT-27 turned north in its attack up the island. C Co, 5th Tank Bn, was ordered to land on beach RED-1 at 1145. Upon landing the tanks were attached to LT-128 and assisted in mopping up behind LT-128 and knocked out enemy emplacements that were holding up its advance. Five tanks were put out of action by mines on the third terrace inland from GREEN-1.
The 75mm Plat, Regimental Weapons Co, in the 6th wave lost one halftrack as it was leaving the LCM. The front wheels became enmeshed in barbed wire laid just below the water line. Attempts to putt the halftrack out were unsuccessful and it was lost for the remainder of the operation. The remainder of the halftracks moved to the left flank of GREEN-1 and delivered heavy fire on pillboxes and caves from which intense mortar and small arms fire was being delivered into the exposed left flank of the Combat Team.
The two 37mm Plats attached to LT-128 and LT-228 succeeded in crossing the beach although one gun and weasel were lost debarking from the LCM and one gun and weasel were destroyed by mortar fire on the beach. No wheeled vehicles were able to cross the beach. They mired in the soft sand and became easy targets for mortar fire. The Rocket Detachment attached to CT-28 lost three trucks on the beach before being able to launch a single rocket. The one remaining rocket truck fired several barrages on the base and north side of SURIBACHI.
From 1100 to 1600, E Co. was attached to LT-128 and assisted in mopping up by-passed enemy positions. At 1600, E Co. returned to Combat Team Reserve. At 1545 LT-228 and LT-328 were ordered to attack south and seize SURIBACHI. Negligible advances were made against strong opposition.
Captain Mears, commanding B Co. and Captain Roach, commanding C Co, were severely wounded and evacuated during LT-128's advance across the island. The Combat Team CP moved to 147S northwest at 1800. LT-128 CP at 147R east. LT-228 CP at 147W northeast. LT-328 CP at 147Y center. Front lines at close of period were on R-A, 132 I center, 147 P southeast, 147 G center.
At the close of D-day it was thought that casualties were much more severe than was actually the case. LT-128 alone reported 600 missing. However many of these men had returned by D+2. They had been fighting with other companies and in some cases other regiments.
Combat efficiency: 85%
(D+1) 20 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Clear and mild
CT 26 (less LT 126 attached to CT 27) maintained positions in 5thMarDiv reserve on this date. At about 1830 one platoon (reinf) of LT 326 was sent to outpost west beach in 163, remainder of LT 326 planned to switch position facing beach should counter-landing threat develop. The only vehicles cleared of the beach and available were those of two of the 37mm platoons and 3 half-tracks. Very little equipment or supplies were received over the beach.
Casualties: 1 Off, 58 Enl.
Effective Strength: 145 Off, 3052 Enl.
27th Marines
At 0330, the enemy launched a counter-attack south of airfield #1 with a sizeable force. This attack was broken up some 300 yards in front of our lines. The enemy continued to pound our CP with artillery and mortars throughout the morning. Our front line units reported their assault troops were being held up by heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire, but they were encountering very little small arms fire and enemy infantry. They reported many enemy pillboxes and land mines in the form of yardstick mines wired to 63 kg. bombs. Two or three enemy artillery pieces in T.S. 199F were reported destroyed by naval gunfire. An enemy dog-tag identified the 145th Infantry Regiment while a captured enemy document disclosed the 2nd Company, 312th Independent Infantry Battalion. One of our reserve units backing up the line on our left flank reported an enemy CP which had been over-run in T.S. 163X, northeast. They reported 300 enemy dead in the area at 0925. The enemy dead reported to date was 400.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Heavy mortar and artillery fire from SURIBACHI and the north end of the island fell throughout the night in our sector. At 2315, an enemy barge landed on the west beach in LT-128's zone. Thirty-nine enemy were killed attempting to get ashore.
Daylight Operations: Ordered by Division to continue attack at 0830, and seize remainder of island in our zone of action. LT-228 and LT-328 were ordered to attack and seize SURIBACHI, 228 on the left. Boundary between LTs: 132 B center, B southwest, F northeast, F southeast, K northeast, L southwest, Q northwest, P southeast, U northeast, U center, 122 A northwest. LT-128 was ordered to extend to the south behind LT-328 and mop up along the west coast as LT-328 advanced. E Co was released to 228 prior to K-hour.
The attack started on time but little progress was made. Tanks were unable to make K-hour because they were not able to refuel and rearm on time. After tanks arrived, an advance of 200 yards was made through a strong mutually supporting maze of reinforced concrete pillboxes. During the afternoon, both Major Allen, commanding D Co, and Captain Young, commanding I Co, were severely wounded and evacuated.
Combat efficiency: 80%
26th Marines
Weather: Clear and mild
CT 26 (less LT 126 attached to CT 27) maintained positions in 5thMarDiv reserve on this date. At about 1830 one platoon (reinf) of LT 326 was sent to outpost west beach in 163, remainder of LT 326 planned to switch position facing beach should counter-landing threat develop. The only vehicles cleared of the beach and available were those of two of the 37mm platoons and 3 half-tracks. Very little equipment or supplies were received over the beach.
Casualties: 1 Off, 58 Enl.
Effective Strength: 145 Off, 3052 Enl.
27th Marines
At 0330, the enemy launched a counter-attack south of airfield #1 with a sizeable force. This attack was broken up some 300 yards in front of our lines. The enemy continued to pound our CP with artillery and mortars throughout the morning. Our front line units reported their assault troops were being held up by heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire, but they were encountering very little small arms fire and enemy infantry. They reported many enemy pillboxes and land mines in the form of yardstick mines wired to 63 kg. bombs. Two or three enemy artillery pieces in T.S. 199F were reported destroyed by naval gunfire. An enemy dog-tag identified the 145th Infantry Regiment while a captured enemy document disclosed the 2nd Company, 312th Independent Infantry Battalion. One of our reserve units backing up the line on our left flank reported an enemy CP which had been over-run in T.S. 163X, northeast. They reported 300 enemy dead in the area at 0925. The enemy dead reported to date was 400.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Heavy mortar and artillery fire from SURIBACHI and the north end of the island fell throughout the night in our sector. At 2315, an enemy barge landed on the west beach in LT-128's zone. Thirty-nine enemy were killed attempting to get ashore.
Daylight Operations: Ordered by Division to continue attack at 0830, and seize remainder of island in our zone of action. LT-228 and LT-328 were ordered to attack and seize SURIBACHI, 228 on the left. Boundary between LTs: 132 B center, B southwest, F northeast, F southeast, K northeast, L southwest, Q northwest, P southeast, U northeast, U center, 122 A northwest. LT-128 was ordered to extend to the south behind LT-328 and mop up along the west coast as LT-328 advanced. E Co was released to 228 prior to K-hour.
The attack started on time but little progress was made. Tanks were unable to make K-hour because they were not able to refuel and rearm on time. After tanks arrived, an advance of 200 yards was made through a strong mutually supporting maze of reinforced concrete pillboxes. During the afternoon, both Major Allen, commanding D Co, and Captain Young, commanding I Co, were severely wounded and evacuated.
Combat efficiency: 80%
(D+2) 21 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Cloudy, scattered light rain.
Elements of CT 26 (less LT 126) were moved north in the zone of action of CT 27 at about 0700, to maintain readiness for employment in that zone. About 1700 shifts in disposition were made in coordinating defenses for the night. Small enemy groups were active along the beach in front of LT 226 between darkness and midnight.
Supply over the beach was but poorly developed and very little organic equipment was received. A serious need for flame thrower servicing and re-supply material arose, and existed for the following three days. Replacement batteries for the SCR-300 radios became very critical and began to cause communication failures in these sets, at which time they were being used for nearly all tactical messages. Wire communication could not be successfully maintained at this stage. By the end of the day most of the vehicles initially landed had been cleared of the beach and the remaining elements of WpnsCo were available for use. 37mm platoons, having been attached to Bns each night only, were attached to Bns at this time and remained attached throughout the operation.
Casualties: 3 Off, 13 Enl.
Effective Strength: 142 Off, 3039 Enl.
27th Marines
During the night one or two enemy troops infiltrated the lines of the unit on our right and stabbed several men. Much enemy activity in front of our lines was reported at 1500 and a normal artillery barrage was laid down. Our right flank received heavy resistance and artillery fire from T.S. 198M,N,O,R, and W. This front line unit reported increasing cave activity in their zone of action. Naval gunfire destroyed two enemy artillery pieces on tracks in T.S. 199F.
A large communication cable running north and south and buried some 3 1/2 feet underground was cut during the day. this cable was believed to have been used as communication line between the enemy units on Mt Suribachi and those in the northern part of the island.
Our tank units reported having found booby-trapped saki bottles and terra cotta mines in T.S. 164A. One of our reserve unite reported booby-trapped enemy equipment in shell holes and fox holes in T.S. 164G, northeast.At 1445, our troops reported having seen about 24 enemy troops committing suicide by leaping from the cliffs in the vicinity of Airfield #1. The enemy dead reported to date was 505.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Heavy mortar and artillery fire continued throughout the night in our sector. The enemy shot up several white and amber pyrotechnics from SURIBACHI, which we later found were signals for artillery to fire from the north end of the island.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 was ordered by Division to continue attack at 0825.
There was still enough distance between our lines and the base of SURIBACHI for air strikes, naval gunfire, and artillery. A 40 plane strike with bombs, rockets, and strafing was executed prior to K-hour. This strike was brought within 100 yards of the front lines at the closest point. This was the closest strike to our lines during the entire operation and was concentrated in an area inaccessible to tanks. This strike was brought so close because the enemy positions holding us up were very near the front lines; also it was thought that the advance of our lines during the day would preclude further use of air.
Prior to K-hour LT-128 was given a one company front on the right of LT-328; otherwise, boundaries and objectives remained the same.
As of D+1, tanks were unable to make K-hour and no advances were made until they arrived. The tanks assisted greatly in knocking out pillboxes and blockhouses and the infantry was able to bore through the main defenses in front of the mountain. After repulsing a small counterattack shortly after noon, LT-28 reached the base of SURIBACHI on both coasts at 1500.
At 1600, nineteen machine gunners from the Motor Transport Bn., with 7 LMG's reported to CT-28 and were divided and sent to LT-128 and LT-328. They remained with the two landing teams for two days and were returned to their parent organization.
Combat efficiency: 75%
26th Marines
Weather: Cloudy, scattered light rain.
Elements of CT 26 (less LT 126) were moved north in the zone of action of CT 27 at about 0700, to maintain readiness for employment in that zone. About 1700 shifts in disposition were made in coordinating defenses for the night. Small enemy groups were active along the beach in front of LT 226 between darkness and midnight.
Supply over the beach was but poorly developed and very little organic equipment was received. A serious need for flame thrower servicing and re-supply material arose, and existed for the following three days. Replacement batteries for the SCR-300 radios became very critical and began to cause communication failures in these sets, at which time they were being used for nearly all tactical messages. Wire communication could not be successfully maintained at this stage. By the end of the day most of the vehicles initially landed had been cleared of the beach and the remaining elements of WpnsCo were available for use. 37mm platoons, having been attached to Bns each night only, were attached to Bns at this time and remained attached throughout the operation.
Casualties: 3 Off, 13 Enl.
Effective Strength: 142 Off, 3039 Enl.
27th Marines
During the night one or two enemy troops infiltrated the lines of the unit on our right and stabbed several men. Much enemy activity in front of our lines was reported at 1500 and a normal artillery barrage was laid down. Our right flank received heavy resistance and artillery fire from T.S. 198M,N,O,R, and W. This front line unit reported increasing cave activity in their zone of action. Naval gunfire destroyed two enemy artillery pieces on tracks in T.S. 199F.
A large communication cable running north and south and buried some 3 1/2 feet underground was cut during the day. this cable was believed to have been used as communication line between the enemy units on Mt Suribachi and those in the northern part of the island.
Our tank units reported having found booby-trapped saki bottles and terra cotta mines in T.S. 164A. One of our reserve unite reported booby-trapped enemy equipment in shell holes and fox holes in T.S. 164G, northeast.At 1445, our troops reported having seen about 24 enemy troops committing suicide by leaping from the cliffs in the vicinity of Airfield #1. The enemy dead reported to date was 505.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Heavy mortar and artillery fire continued throughout the night in our sector. The enemy shot up several white and amber pyrotechnics from SURIBACHI, which we later found were signals for artillery to fire from the north end of the island.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 was ordered by Division to continue attack at 0825.
There was still enough distance between our lines and the base of SURIBACHI for air strikes, naval gunfire, and artillery. A 40 plane strike with bombs, rockets, and strafing was executed prior to K-hour. This strike was brought within 100 yards of the front lines at the closest point. This was the closest strike to our lines during the entire operation and was concentrated in an area inaccessible to tanks. This strike was brought so close because the enemy positions holding us up were very near the front lines; also it was thought that the advance of our lines during the day would preclude further use of air.
Prior to K-hour LT-128 was given a one company front on the right of LT-328; otherwise, boundaries and objectives remained the same.
As of D+1, tanks were unable to make K-hour and no advances were made until they arrived. The tanks assisted greatly in knocking out pillboxes and blockhouses and the infantry was able to bore through the main defenses in front of the mountain. After repulsing a small counterattack shortly after noon, LT-28 reached the base of SURIBACHI on both coasts at 1500.
At 1600, nineteen machine gunners from the Motor Transport Bn., with 7 LMG's reported to CT-28 and were divided and sent to LT-128 and LT-328. They remained with the two landing teams for two days and were returned to their parent organization.
Combat efficiency: 75%
(D+3) 22 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Steady rain, poor visibility.
CT 26, with 5thTankBn (less one company) attached, moved out at daybreak and passed through CT 27 in resumption of the attack to seize (O-2; LT 126 reverting to CT 26 and LT 227 becoming attached to CT 26, effective on the passage of lines. LT 226 and LT 326 moved up to the front lines in a steady rain and under heavy mortar and artillery fire and completed passage of lines at about 0910. In passing through corresponding elements of CT 27, LT 326 had to extend about 200 yards into the zone of 4thMarDiv on the right, and LT 226 over-extended its right boundary for similar reason. Rather than attempt to adjust lines by lateral movement while under heavy enemy fire, it was decided to accomplish the same in advancing toward O-2. The attack advanced about 400 yards in the center, but in the right elements were unable to advance. The bluff line parallel to the direction of attack in the left of the zone of action of the 4thMarDiv completely dominated the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv. No part of this bluff was occupied by 4thMarDiv elements on this date. All forward elements of CT 26 received heavy artillery and mortar fire and the attacking troops were pinned down by heavy enfilade fire from positions in the bluff.
Frontal resistance, from pillboxes, was secondary to the above fires. Action of tanks in right of the zone was unsuccessful due to the heavy AT fire from the bluff positions. At about 0940 the CO of LT 326 (LtCol Tom M. Trotti) and the Bn-3 were killed. The Bn-X having already been wounded and evacuated, Major Richard Fagan was assigned command of LT 326. Between 1630 and 1800 and again at about 2200 uncoordinated counter-attacks on the left front, and to lesser extent in the center, were repulsed by artillery and infantry fire. At about 1700 LT 226 and the left of LT 326, holding completely untenable ground in the center salient, were forced to withdraw and all elements organized lines for the night on essentially the same positions from which attack was launched. Lines still extended well beyond the right CT boundary into the zone of the 3rdMarDiv (3rdMarDiv having taken over during the day from the 4thMarDiv). Due to beach conditions a shortage of many items developed. However replacement batteries for radios were received late in the day and provided immediate improvement in SCR-300 communication. The need for usable roads leading to forward supply dumps became acutely felt.
Casualties: 5 Off, 95 Enl.
Effective Strength: 137 Off, 2944 Enl.
27th Marines
Our beach defense units reported an attempted counter-landing in T.S. 180J by an estimated 50 men and another in T.S. 180O by an estimated 400 men during the night. These landing attempts were repulsed by our beach defense units and naval gunfire. The enemy attempted no offensive action during the morning, but shelled our positions with mortar and artillery fire. This combat team became division reserve at 1300 on this date when passage of lines was competed. The enemy dead reported to date was 515.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Sporadic mortar and artillery fire landed in our area through the night. The Japs again sent up flares from SURIBACHI. At 2335, three enemy swimmers were killed attempting to come ashore on the west beach. An attempted dawn infiltration was made against LT-228 and LT-328 but was unsuccessful.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 continued the attack at 0835 with three landing teams abreast; boundaries and objectives remained the same. By 1015, LT-228 on the east and LT-128 on the west were moving around the base of the mountain. Lt. Comdr Mc Carthy, Regimental Surgeon, was killed in the CP by a mortar burst about 0800.
Bad weather and poor visibility throughout the day hampered our operations considerably. The rain mixed with volcanic dust caused stoppages in practically all automatic weapons, reducing them to single shot weapons. Units were ordered to consolidate at 1630.
Combat efficiency: 70%
26th Marines
Weather: Steady rain, poor visibility.
CT 26, with 5thTankBn (less one company) attached, moved out at daybreak and passed through CT 27 in resumption of the attack to seize (O-2; LT 126 reverting to CT 26 and LT 227 becoming attached to CT 26, effective on the passage of lines. LT 226 and LT 326 moved up to the front lines in a steady rain and under heavy mortar and artillery fire and completed passage of lines at about 0910. In passing through corresponding elements of CT 27, LT 326 had to extend about 200 yards into the zone of 4thMarDiv on the right, and LT 226 over-extended its right boundary for similar reason. Rather than attempt to adjust lines by lateral movement while under heavy enemy fire, it was decided to accomplish the same in advancing toward O-2. The attack advanced about 400 yards in the center, but in the right elements were unable to advance. The bluff line parallel to the direction of attack in the left of the zone of action of the 4thMarDiv completely dominated the zone of action of the 5thMarDiv. No part of this bluff was occupied by 4thMarDiv elements on this date. All forward elements of CT 26 received heavy artillery and mortar fire and the attacking troops were pinned down by heavy enfilade fire from positions in the bluff.
Frontal resistance, from pillboxes, was secondary to the above fires. Action of tanks in right of the zone was unsuccessful due to the heavy AT fire from the bluff positions. At about 0940 the CO of LT 326 (LtCol Tom M. Trotti) and the Bn-3 were killed. The Bn-X having already been wounded and evacuated, Major Richard Fagan was assigned command of LT 326. Between 1630 and 1800 and again at about 2200 uncoordinated counter-attacks on the left front, and to lesser extent in the center, were repulsed by artillery and infantry fire. At about 1700 LT 226 and the left of LT 326, holding completely untenable ground in the center salient, were forced to withdraw and all elements organized lines for the night on essentially the same positions from which attack was launched. Lines still extended well beyond the right CT boundary into the zone of the 3rdMarDiv (3rdMarDiv having taken over during the day from the 4thMarDiv). Due to beach conditions a shortage of many items developed. However replacement batteries for radios were received late in the day and provided immediate improvement in SCR-300 communication. The need for usable roads leading to forward supply dumps became acutely felt.
Casualties: 5 Off, 95 Enl.
Effective Strength: 137 Off, 2944 Enl.
27th Marines
Our beach defense units reported an attempted counter-landing in T.S. 180J by an estimated 50 men and another in T.S. 180O by an estimated 400 men during the night. These landing attempts were repulsed by our beach defense units and naval gunfire. The enemy attempted no offensive action during the morning, but shelled our positions with mortar and artillery fire. This combat team became division reserve at 1300 on this date when passage of lines was competed. The enemy dead reported to date was 515.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Sporadic mortar and artillery fire landed in our area through the night. The Japs again sent up flares from SURIBACHI. At 2335, three enemy swimmers were killed attempting to come ashore on the west beach. An attempted dawn infiltration was made against LT-228 and LT-328 but was unsuccessful.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 continued the attack at 0835 with three landing teams abreast; boundaries and objectives remained the same. By 1015, LT-228 on the east and LT-128 on the west were moving around the base of the mountain. Lt. Comdr Mc Carthy, Regimental Surgeon, was killed in the CP by a mortar burst about 0800.
Bad weather and poor visibility throughout the day hampered our operations considerably. The rain mixed with volcanic dust caused stoppages in practically all automatic weapons, reducing them to single shot weapons. Units were ordered to consolidate at 1630.
Combat efficiency: 70%
(D+4) 23 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Cloudy, visibility good.
At about 0400 LT 126 received a counter-attack by an enemy force estimated at 400 to 500. This attack was broken up with difficulty by artillery fires and very close quarter fighting. At daybreak LT 227 moved forward and effected relief in the line of LT 126. In view of conformation of ground to the front (high ground on the right and flat beach on the left), CT 26 planned to echelon the advance to the left rear. The attack to seize O-2 was launched at 0738 and, though later attempts to resume the advance were made, no appreciable gains were made this date. 3rdMarDiv elements on the right made no progress in reduction of bluff positions and heavy enfilade fire from these positions stopped every attempt of LT 326 to get under way. At about 1000 LtCol Joseph P. Sayers, commanding LT 226, was wounded and evacuated. Major Amedeo Rea, Bn-x, assumed command of LT 226. Due to the fact that the area concerned was under extremely heavy fire for effecting relief, LT 326 maintained positions that extended into the 3rdMarDiv zone, and defense lines for the night were tied in as for the previous night. Deficiencies in weapons and weapons parts reached serious proportion due largely to heavy rain of previous date. No spare weapons nor spare parts had been landed. The supply of 81mm ammunition and demolitions was maintained only with considerable difficulty. (Throughout the operation 81mm, H.E., light, remained a critical item of supply). Adequate beach exits and usable roads partly into forward areas began to help the supply situation considerably.
Casualties: 2 Off, 126 Enl.
Effective Strength: 135 Off, 2818 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team continued to be division reserve. Division reports that our basic map may have been compromised due to copies being lost in battle. Security precautions were taken. At 0300, an undetermined number of enemy infiltrated our lines along the west coast. The following units were identified from documents; Tan 7180 unit, Nishiki unit, Akatsuki 16722 unit, Nakayama unit, Ito unit, and Special Naval Landing force unit 1198. Pull-type booby-traps were found attached to some enemy dead and also to saki bottles and helmets. Artillery and mortar fire was received around the CP all day. Fire seems to be concentrating on roads west of Airfield #1 near our CP. One POW was captured in T.S. 163R. He was a member of a naval guard unit. At 2030, FLASH RED. At 2115, ALL CLEAR. The enemy dead reported to date was 645.
28th Marines
Night Activity: A miserable night was spent by all because of the heavy rain during the previous day and sporadic enemy mortar fire through the night. Attempted enemy infiltration during the night failed.
Daylight Operations: The attack commenced at 0900. LT-228 was ordered to secure and occupy the crest of SURIBACHI. LT-128 was ordered to pass one company through LT-328's right company. LT-328's remaining company on the line was attached to LT-128 and LT-128 was further ordered to attack around the base of the mountain and contact LT-228 on the southern tip of the island. It was impossible to scale the mountain in LT-128's zone of action. A four man patrol followed by a forty man patrol led by 1st Lt. Schrier of LT-228 reached the top of SURIBACHI on the northeast rim of the crater at 1020 and raised the national color. At 1130, elements of 128 met elements of 228 on the southern tip of the island. Objective R-B was reported secured except for mopping up.
Messages congratulating CT-28 on the seizure of SURIBACHI were received from Lt. Gen. Smith, Vice Admiral Turner, and Maj. Gen. Rockey, Commanding General of the 5th Marine Division. The remainder of the day was spent in mopping up, blowing caves, etc. For night defense, 40 men from E Co were left on top of SURIBACHI and the Combat Team set up a defense line extending from the east beach in 132 R southwest to the west beach in 132 E west, thence up the west beach to 147 B.
Combat efficiency: 65%
26th Marines
Weather: Cloudy, visibility good.
At about 0400 LT 126 received a counter-attack by an enemy force estimated at 400 to 500. This attack was broken up with difficulty by artillery fires and very close quarter fighting. At daybreak LT 227 moved forward and effected relief in the line of LT 126. In view of conformation of ground to the front (high ground on the right and flat beach on the left), CT 26 planned to echelon the advance to the left rear. The attack to seize O-2 was launched at 0738 and, though later attempts to resume the advance were made, no appreciable gains were made this date. 3rdMarDiv elements on the right made no progress in reduction of bluff positions and heavy enfilade fire from these positions stopped every attempt of LT 326 to get under way. At about 1000 LtCol Joseph P. Sayers, commanding LT 226, was wounded and evacuated. Major Amedeo Rea, Bn-x, assumed command of LT 226. Due to the fact that the area concerned was under extremely heavy fire for effecting relief, LT 326 maintained positions that extended into the 3rdMarDiv zone, and defense lines for the night were tied in as for the previous night. Deficiencies in weapons and weapons parts reached serious proportion due largely to heavy rain of previous date. No spare weapons nor spare parts had been landed. The supply of 81mm ammunition and demolitions was maintained only with considerable difficulty. (Throughout the operation 81mm, H.E., light, remained a critical item of supply). Adequate beach exits and usable roads partly into forward areas began to help the supply situation considerably.
Casualties: 2 Off, 126 Enl.
Effective Strength: 135 Off, 2818 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team continued to be division reserve. Division reports that our basic map may have been compromised due to copies being lost in battle. Security precautions were taken. At 0300, an undetermined number of enemy infiltrated our lines along the west coast. The following units were identified from documents; Tan 7180 unit, Nishiki unit, Akatsuki 16722 unit, Nakayama unit, Ito unit, and Special Naval Landing force unit 1198. Pull-type booby-traps were found attached to some enemy dead and also to saki bottles and helmets. Artillery and mortar fire was received around the CP all day. Fire seems to be concentrating on roads west of Airfield #1 near our CP. One POW was captured in T.S. 163R. He was a member of a naval guard unit. At 2030, FLASH RED. At 2115, ALL CLEAR. The enemy dead reported to date was 645.
28th Marines
Night Activity: A miserable night was spent by all because of the heavy rain during the previous day and sporadic enemy mortar fire through the night. Attempted enemy infiltration during the night failed.
Daylight Operations: The attack commenced at 0900. LT-228 was ordered to secure and occupy the crest of SURIBACHI. LT-128 was ordered to pass one company through LT-328's right company. LT-328's remaining company on the line was attached to LT-128 and LT-128 was further ordered to attack around the base of the mountain and contact LT-228 on the southern tip of the island. It was impossible to scale the mountain in LT-128's zone of action. A four man patrol followed by a forty man patrol led by 1st Lt. Schrier of LT-228 reached the top of SURIBACHI on the northeast rim of the crater at 1020 and raised the national color. At 1130, elements of 128 met elements of 228 on the southern tip of the island. Objective R-B was reported secured except for mopping up.
Messages congratulating CT-28 on the seizure of SURIBACHI were received from Lt. Gen. Smith, Vice Admiral Turner, and Maj. Gen. Rockey, Commanding General of the 5th Marine Division. The remainder of the day was spent in mopping up, blowing caves, etc. For night defense, 40 men from E Co were left on top of SURIBACHI and the Combat Team set up a defense line extending from the east beach in 132 R southwest to the west beach in 132 E west, thence up the west beach to 147 B.
Combat efficiency: 65%
(D+5) 24 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Clear and cool
CT 26 (plus LT 227 continuing attached) planned to resume coordinated attack to seize O-2 at the time at which 3rdMarDiv elements on the right advanced sufficiently along the bluff to knock out positions enfilading CT 26. At 1350, following artillery preparation and rocket barrage, the jump-off was made. Steady progress was made for about 500 yards until about 1600 contact was lost with 3rdMarDiv elements, unable to keep up along bluff line. At this time LT 326 was receiving grenades and heavy fire from cave and pillbox positions in the bluff stopping the advance for this date. Lines were tied in for the night by committing elements of LT 126 into gaps on the extreme right and left to extend front lines rearward; it was thereafter necessary for LT 126 to maintain these contact positions until CT 27 passed through CT 26 on D+8. 3dSec, 6th War Dog Platoon, was attached to CT 26. Salvage collection and repair of weapons as well as other equipment was needed but had not functioned to date, due chiefly to the intensity of fires in the forward areas.
Casualties: 21 Off, 332 Enl.
Effective strength; 114 Off, 2486 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat continued to be division reserve. 30 enemy troops were found around sulfur hole at T.S. 181P. Several committed suicide and the others were mopped up. These included 3 officers. Mine fields of horn type mines were discovered in T.S. 181D and M. Fields are small in area. Over-run mortar positions were found booby-trapped. Roads west of Airfield #1 continue to receive heavy artillery and mortar fire when they were in use. The enemy dead reported to date was 645.
28th Marines
Night Activity: A few scattered rounds of high velocity enemy artillery fell around the base of SURIBACHI. 122 Japs were killed trying to infiltrate our lines. Many had demolitions tied to their bodies and were apparently trying to reach Corps and Division artillery. Also, during the night several 320mm mortars passed overhead and landed out to sea. It is amusing to note that this mortar was at first thought to be a P-61 nightfighter because of the peculiar sound made while passing over.
Daylight Operations: All units continued mopping up on and around SURIBACHI. Units also reorganized, and began salvage of arms and equipment. The 3d Platoon, 5th MP Co. reverted to company control this date. Lines for the night remained the same.
Combat efficiency: 65%
26th Marines
Weather: Clear and cool
CT 26 (plus LT 227 continuing attached) planned to resume coordinated attack to seize O-2 at the time at which 3rdMarDiv elements on the right advanced sufficiently along the bluff to knock out positions enfilading CT 26. At 1350, following artillery preparation and rocket barrage, the jump-off was made. Steady progress was made for about 500 yards until about 1600 contact was lost with 3rdMarDiv elements, unable to keep up along bluff line. At this time LT 326 was receiving grenades and heavy fire from cave and pillbox positions in the bluff stopping the advance for this date. Lines were tied in for the night by committing elements of LT 126 into gaps on the extreme right and left to extend front lines rearward; it was thereafter necessary for LT 126 to maintain these contact positions until CT 27 passed through CT 26 on D+8. 3dSec, 6th War Dog Platoon, was attached to CT 26. Salvage collection and repair of weapons as well as other equipment was needed but had not functioned to date, due chiefly to the intensity of fires in the forward areas.
Casualties: 21 Off, 332 Enl.
Effective strength; 114 Off, 2486 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat continued to be division reserve. 30 enemy troops were found around sulfur hole at T.S. 181P. Several committed suicide and the others were mopped up. These included 3 officers. Mine fields of horn type mines were discovered in T.S. 181D and M. Fields are small in area. Over-run mortar positions were found booby-trapped. Roads west of Airfield #1 continue to receive heavy artillery and mortar fire when they were in use. The enemy dead reported to date was 645.
28th Marines
Night Activity: A few scattered rounds of high velocity enemy artillery fell around the base of SURIBACHI. 122 Japs were killed trying to infiltrate our lines. Many had demolitions tied to their bodies and were apparently trying to reach Corps and Division artillery. Also, during the night several 320mm mortars passed overhead and landed out to sea. It is amusing to note that this mortar was at first thought to be a P-61 nightfighter because of the peculiar sound made while passing over.
Daylight Operations: All units continued mopping up on and around SURIBACHI. Units also reorganized, and began salvage of arms and equipment. The 3d Platoon, 5th MP Co. reverted to company control this date. Lines for the night remained the same.
Combat efficiency: 65%
(D+6) 25 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Cool, cloudy; visibility good.
In view of repeated failures of attacks due to heavy enfilade fires from the bluff line, CT 26 planned to attack to seize O-2 only when 3rdMarDiv elements had occupied bluff line well out ahead of LT 326. A coordinated attack was prearranged but was never placed in effect on this date inasmuch as the required situation on the right of CT 26 zone failed to develop. General supply, by this date, had begun to improve considerably. Salvage and evacuation of wounded and dead was still carried out only with difficulty.
Casualties: 2 Off, 75 Enl.
Effective Strength: 112 Off, 2411 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team continued to be division reserve. The fin of a flying bomb which measured 2 1/2 feet in length was found by this combat team. 300 lb. depth charge, type 2, was found rigged as a land mine in T.S. 147O. The enemy dead reported to date was 697.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Continued light artillery fire from guns in northern part of island. A few Nips infiltrators were killed attempting to get through our lines at the base of SURIBACHI.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 reverted to Corps Reserve at 0630. Ordered to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area and be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, or 5th Mar Divs. Colonel Liversedge, and the battalion commanders and operations officer reconnoitered routes to the front in the 3d, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions' zone of action. The infantry, with engineers attached, closed numerous caves and ferreted out small groups of snipers throughout the day. Location of front lines and CP's remained the same as of D+5.
Combat efficiency: 65%
26th Marines
Weather: Cool, cloudy; visibility good.
In view of repeated failures of attacks due to heavy enfilade fires from the bluff line, CT 26 planned to attack to seize O-2 only when 3rdMarDiv elements had occupied bluff line well out ahead of LT 326. A coordinated attack was prearranged but was never placed in effect on this date inasmuch as the required situation on the right of CT 26 zone failed to develop. General supply, by this date, had begun to improve considerably. Salvage and evacuation of wounded and dead was still carried out only with difficulty.
Casualties: 2 Off, 75 Enl.
Effective Strength: 112 Off, 2411 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team continued to be division reserve. The fin of a flying bomb which measured 2 1/2 feet in length was found by this combat team. 300 lb. depth charge, type 2, was found rigged as a land mine in T.S. 147O. The enemy dead reported to date was 697.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Continued light artillery fire from guns in northern part of island. A few Nips infiltrators were killed attempting to get through our lines at the base of SURIBACHI.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 reverted to Corps Reserve at 0630. Ordered to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area and be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, or 5th Mar Divs. Colonel Liversedge, and the battalion commanders and operations officer reconnoitered routes to the front in the 3d, 4th and 5th Marine Divisions' zone of action. The infantry, with engineers attached, closed numerous caves and ferreted out small groups of snipers throughout the day. Location of front lines and CP's remained the same as of D+5.
Combat efficiency: 65%
(D+7) 26 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Cool and cloudy, visibility good.
CT 26 launched coordinated attack at 0800 to seize O-2, with support of tanks. Although 3rdMarDiv elements had not secured the bluff lines abreast of CT 26 front lines, fires from the bluff decreased; however, resistance from bluff positions still impede the advance of the company on the extreme right. Enemy resistance was chiefly from pillboxes and caves and a number of such positions were destroyed during the day, flushing enemy troops into the open at times. Half-tracks were used on D+7 and D+8 to fire on KAMA rock for the purpose of neutralizing enemy fire direction operations believed conducted form there. Half-tracks had no other opportunity to fire until the northern plateau was reached, as they were considered to vulnerable for use in the exposed area. Organic equipment and supplies had become available to all units.
Casualties: 1 Off, 139 Enl.
Effective Strength: 111 Off, 2272 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team remained in division reserve. At 0945, a POW was captured by Regimental Weapons Co. in T.S. 181O, center. Areas around wells in T.S. 181K, northeast; 197T, southwest; and 198P, west, were found to be mined with yardstick mines attached to aerial bombs. The enemy dead reported to date was 722.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Generally quiet, with only a few rounds of artillery falling in our lines at the base of SURIBACHI.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 ordered by Corps to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area and be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, or 5th Mar Divs. Infantry, with engineers attached, continued closing caves and destroying remaining snipers. Twenty Japs were killed in a large cave on NW slope of SURIBACHI and six were killed in an AA position on N slope. I Co, LT-328, assisted engineers in clearing shrapnel from runway of Airfield #1. Location of front lines and CP's remained the same on D+6.
Combat efficiency: 65%
26th Marines
Weather: Cool and cloudy, visibility good.
CT 26 launched coordinated attack at 0800 to seize O-2, with support of tanks. Although 3rdMarDiv elements had not secured the bluff lines abreast of CT 26 front lines, fires from the bluff decreased; however, resistance from bluff positions still impede the advance of the company on the extreme right. Enemy resistance was chiefly from pillboxes and caves and a number of such positions were destroyed during the day, flushing enemy troops into the open at times. Half-tracks were used on D+7 and D+8 to fire on KAMA rock for the purpose of neutralizing enemy fire direction operations believed conducted form there. Half-tracks had no other opportunity to fire until the northern plateau was reached, as they were considered to vulnerable for use in the exposed area. Organic equipment and supplies had become available to all units.
Casualties: 1 Off, 139 Enl.
Effective Strength: 111 Off, 2272 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team remained in division reserve. At 0945, a POW was captured by Regimental Weapons Co. in T.S. 181O, center. Areas around wells in T.S. 181K, northeast; 197T, southwest; and 198P, west, were found to be mined with yardstick mines attached to aerial bombs. The enemy dead reported to date was 722.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Generally quiet, with only a few rounds of artillery falling in our lines at the base of SURIBACHI.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 ordered by Corps to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area and be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, or 5th Mar Divs. Infantry, with engineers attached, continued closing caves and destroying remaining snipers. Twenty Japs were killed in a large cave on NW slope of SURIBACHI and six were killed in an AA position on N slope. I Co, LT-328, assisted engineers in clearing shrapnel from runway of Airfield #1. Location of front lines and CP's remained the same on D+6.
Combat efficiency: 65%
(D+8) 27 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Partly cloudy and cool, visibility good.
At 0630 elements of CT 27 began relief of lines and at 0800 passed through CT 26 in attack. Effective on passage of lines, LT 227 reverted to CT 27, and LT 126 was attached to CT 27. CT 26 in status of 5thMarDiv reserve, withdrew into unit assembly areas. reorganization, salvage, and evacuation of dead from forward areas were conducted while in reserve. Units were disposed for security from the north and west for the night. Enemy identifications indicate that CT 26 for the previous five days was opposed by elements of the 311th and 312th Independent Infantry Battalions. Although some enemy dead had been found, there were positive indications that nearly all enemy dead and wounded had been removed under cover of darkness, as they withdrew. With the exception of minor night activity the enemy fought almost entirely in position from very strong caves and pillboxes that were extremely well camouflaged, and was but rarely seen above the ground in the open. (This characterized enemy defensive action throughout the operation).
Casualties 5 Off, 113 Enl.
Effective Strength: 106 Off, 2159 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team was committed again on this date. At K Hour, light mortar fire was encountered. Later, light and ineffective small arms fire was encountered. No determined resistance met our advance. The enemy used whit phosphorous to screen a small troop movement shortly after K Hour. the use of artillery and mortar fire decreased from that of previous days. The enemy dead reported to date was 840.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Continued scattered shelling from artillery in northern part of island.
Daylight Operations: Ordered by Corps to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area and be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, 5th Mar Divs. At 1325, CT-28 was ordered to move LT-328 to assembly area in 181 B and G. The necessary orders were issued and by 1800, LT-328 was in position as directed. LT-128 and LT-228 continued mopping up around MT SURIBACHI. Both landing teams were ordered to be prepared to move to forward assembly area in northern sector on two hours notice. Lines at the base of SURIBACHI remained the same for the night.
Combat efficiency: 70%
26th Marines
Weather: Partly cloudy and cool, visibility good.
At 0630 elements of CT 27 began relief of lines and at 0800 passed through CT 26 in attack. Effective on passage of lines, LT 227 reverted to CT 27, and LT 126 was attached to CT 27. CT 26 in status of 5thMarDiv reserve, withdrew into unit assembly areas. reorganization, salvage, and evacuation of dead from forward areas were conducted while in reserve. Units were disposed for security from the north and west for the night. Enemy identifications indicate that CT 26 for the previous five days was opposed by elements of the 311th and 312th Independent Infantry Battalions. Although some enemy dead had been found, there were positive indications that nearly all enemy dead and wounded had been removed under cover of darkness, as they withdrew. With the exception of minor night activity the enemy fought almost entirely in position from very strong caves and pillboxes that were extremely well camouflaged, and was but rarely seen above the ground in the open. (This characterized enemy defensive action throughout the operation).
Casualties 5 Off, 113 Enl.
Effective Strength: 106 Off, 2159 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team was committed again on this date. At K Hour, light mortar fire was encountered. Later, light and ineffective small arms fire was encountered. No determined resistance met our advance. The enemy used whit phosphorous to screen a small troop movement shortly after K Hour. the use of artillery and mortar fire decreased from that of previous days. The enemy dead reported to date was 840.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Continued scattered shelling from artillery in northern part of island.
Daylight Operations: Ordered by Corps to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area and be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, 5th Mar Divs. At 1325, CT-28 was ordered to move LT-328 to assembly area in 181 B and G. The necessary orders were issued and by 1800, LT-328 was in position as directed. LT-128 and LT-228 continued mopping up around MT SURIBACHI. Both landing teams were ordered to be prepared to move to forward assembly area in northern sector on two hours notice. Lines at the base of SURIBACHI remained the same for the night.
Combat efficiency: 70%
(D+9) 28 February 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Partly cloudy, visibility good
CT 26 (less LT 126 attached to CT 27) was in 5thMarDiv reserve in position to support the action of CT 27. At about 1000 LT 226 was also attached to CT 27. Some progress had been made in salvage and replacement of weapons, though considerably more service was needed particularly with respect to BARs, flame throwers and bazookas.
Casualties: 3 Off, 43 Enl. Replacements: 4 Off, 42 Enl.
Effective strength: 107 Off, 2158 Enl.
At about this point the loss of junior officers and non-commissioned officers began to seriously affect the efficiency of the command.
27th Marines
At 0150, this combat team's CP received fire of large caliber mortars or artillery causing several casualties. Minor infiltrations were attempted during the night by enemy using only had grenades. Several enemy, wearing Marine Uniforms, were observed throwing grenades into our front lines. Higashi 2720 unit was identified by our right front battalion. In the afternoon, stiff resistance was encountered by our right front battalion. Snipers in pillboxes, caves, and prepared positions and machine guns, knee mortars, and larger caliber mortars held up our advance. An abandoned enemy CP was found in T.S. 199L, east. The enemy dead reported to date was 1042.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Very quiet.
Daylight Operations: Ordered by Corps to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area with one battalion. Move one of two remaining battalions in SURIBACHI area to assembly area vicinity 181 GF by 1500. Be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, or 5th Mar Divs. LT-128 was ordered to move to 181 GF and to reconnoiter routes to front line preparatory to attacking in 5th Mar Div zone of action. At 1100, LT-328 was released to 5th Mar Div control. LT-227 was ordered to relieve LT-228, and CT-28 was ordered to move to assembly area vicinity 181 QR. Also we were informed that the Combat Team would revert to 5th Mar Div control at 0600, 1 March.
The 3d Plat, 5th MP Co, returned to CT-28 control at 1200. At 1300, CT-28 opened the new CP in 181 Q. During the afternoon, LT-227 relieved LT-228 in the SURIBACHI area and LT-228 moved to assembly area in 198 G. Also during the afternoon Colonel Liversedge and the Battalion Commanders reconnoitered routes to the front lines in the 5th Mar Div zone of action preparatory to relieving CT-27 and going into the attack on 1 March. A total of nine officers and two hundred eighty-three enlisted replacements from the 27th and 31st Replacement drafts had been received during the past two days and distributed among landing teams. Location of troops at close of period: LT-128 in 181 P L; LT-228 in 198 G; LT-328 in 181 Q R.
Combat efficiency: 70%
26th Marines
Weather: Partly cloudy, visibility good
CT 26 (less LT 126 attached to CT 27) was in 5thMarDiv reserve in position to support the action of CT 27. At about 1000 LT 226 was also attached to CT 27. Some progress had been made in salvage and replacement of weapons, though considerably more service was needed particularly with respect to BARs, flame throwers and bazookas.
Casualties: 3 Off, 43 Enl. Replacements: 4 Off, 42 Enl.
Effective strength: 107 Off, 2158 Enl.
At about this point the loss of junior officers and non-commissioned officers began to seriously affect the efficiency of the command.
27th Marines
At 0150, this combat team's CP received fire of large caliber mortars or artillery causing several casualties. Minor infiltrations were attempted during the night by enemy using only had grenades. Several enemy, wearing Marine Uniforms, were observed throwing grenades into our front lines. Higashi 2720 unit was identified by our right front battalion. In the afternoon, stiff resistance was encountered by our right front battalion. Snipers in pillboxes, caves, and prepared positions and machine guns, knee mortars, and larger caliber mortars held up our advance. An abandoned enemy CP was found in T.S. 199L, east. The enemy dead reported to date was 1042.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Very quiet.
Daylight Operations: Ordered by Corps to continue mopping up in SURIBACHI area with one battalion. Move one of two remaining battalions in SURIBACHI area to assembly area vicinity 181 GF by 1500. Be prepared to attack in zone of action of 3d, 4th, or 5th Mar Divs. LT-128 was ordered to move to 181 GF and to reconnoiter routes to front line preparatory to attacking in 5th Mar Div zone of action. At 1100, LT-328 was released to 5th Mar Div control. LT-227 was ordered to relieve LT-228, and CT-28 was ordered to move to assembly area vicinity 181 QR. Also we were informed that the Combat Team would revert to 5th Mar Div control at 0600, 1 March.
The 3d Plat, 5th MP Co, returned to CT-28 control at 1200. At 1300, CT-28 opened the new CP in 181 Q. During the afternoon, LT-227 relieved LT-228 in the SURIBACHI area and LT-228 moved to assembly area in 198 G. Also during the afternoon Colonel Liversedge and the Battalion Commanders reconnoitered routes to the front lines in the 5th Mar Div zone of action preparatory to relieving CT-27 and going into the attack on 1 March. A total of nine officers and two hundred eighty-three enlisted replacements from the 27th and 31st Replacement drafts had been received during the past two days and distributed among landing teams. Location of troops at close of period: LT-128 in 181 P L; LT-228 in 198 G; LT-328 in 181 Q R.
Combat efficiency: 70%
(D+10) 1 March 1945
26th Marines
Weather: Scattered showers, visibility good
At daybreak on passage of CT 27 lines by CT 28, LT 126 and LT 226 reverted to CT 26 in 5thMarDiv reserve. About 1340 CT 26 was committed to action, in that LT 326 was ordered to move forward into a gap in the lines between CT 28 and 3rdMarDiv elements. LT 226 was moved to a forward position in CT reserve. CT 26 CP was displaced forward. General advance having carried to the northern plateau of the island, the enemy had lost most of his commanding observation and a considerable number of his heavy guns, resultant in greater freedom of movement and less casualties in rear areas. Supply has progressed to a normal standard.
Casualties: 1 Off, 69 Enl. Replacements 10 Off, 385 Enl.
Effective strength: 116 Off, 2474 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team became division reserve on this date. Flame throwers and demolitions were captured in T.S. 199K, west. Rocket launchers and dump were captured in T.S. 199G, northeast. At 1605, a POW was captured in T.S. 215T. Enemy dead reported to date was 1042.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Very quiet.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 was ordered by Division as follows: 28th Marines with 5th Tank Bn, and 3d Bn, 27th Marines, attached, will at K-hour (0830) pass through 27th Marines, seize O-2 and D-A in Division zone of action, be prepared to seize O-3 on order.
All three landing teams moved into the line abreast relieving three landing teams of CT-27. Relief was completed by 0850. Boundary between LT-128 and 228: 216 R northeast, M east, H east. Boundary between LT-328 and LT-228 216 K center, F center, A northwest. Boundary between LT-128 and CT-26; 217 P W center, K southwest, K northwest. Order of LT's from left to right: 328, 228,128. LT-327 was sent to assembly area in reserve in 199 K.
Hill 362 was the most formidable terrain feature confronting us. The hill provided enemy observation of the entire western side of the island and all the way south to SURIBACHI. It was rugged and rocky with no vegetation on the south, while on the north side was a sheer cliff about 80 feet high and dotted with many caves both large and small. This hill, or cliff line, extended in front of both LT-128 and LT-228. The attack was delayed 20 minutes in order to allow for completion of the relief of CT-27. Because of the extremely wide front, LT-128 was unable to relieve two companies of LT-326 which had been on the right of LT-327, and attached to CT-27. The attack moved slowly ahead under severe mortar and small arms fire. The same type of dogged enemy defense was encountered here as was encountered on SURIBACHI. By 1030, LT-128 and LT-228 had reached the top of 362 and the ridgeline running east and west from it, but were unable to negotiate the steep cliff on the north side because of heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Artillery, mortars, and rockets were concentrated in front of the hill but with little effect. At 1330, LT-128 committed its reserve company around the right side of the hill but was unable to contact LT-228, so the lines were consolidated for the night on the hill and ridgeline running east and west from it. C Co, 5th Tank Bn, was attached to LT-228 and also supported LT-128 and LT-328 by fire. Captain Wilkins, Commanding A Co, was killed during the day while leading his company against Hill 362. At 1700, H Co, of LT-327 was attached to LT-128 to back up its line for the night with orders to revert to LT-327 at 0730, 3 March. CP's; LT-128 in 199 B, LT-228 in 216 P, LT-328 in 198 C.
Combat efficiency: 65%
26th Marines
Weather: Scattered showers, visibility good
At daybreak on passage of CT 27 lines by CT 28, LT 126 and LT 226 reverted to CT 26 in 5thMarDiv reserve. About 1340 CT 26 was committed to action, in that LT 326 was ordered to move forward into a gap in the lines between CT 28 and 3rdMarDiv elements. LT 226 was moved to a forward position in CT reserve. CT 26 CP was displaced forward. General advance having carried to the northern plateau of the island, the enemy had lost most of his commanding observation and a considerable number of his heavy guns, resultant in greater freedom of movement and less casualties in rear areas. Supply has progressed to a normal standard.
Casualties: 1 Off, 69 Enl. Replacements 10 Off, 385 Enl.
Effective strength: 116 Off, 2474 Enl.
27th Marines
This combat team became division reserve on this date. Flame throwers and demolitions were captured in T.S. 199K, west. Rocket launchers and dump were captured in T.S. 199G, northeast. At 1605, a POW was captured in T.S. 215T. Enemy dead reported to date was 1042.
28th Marines
Night Activity: Very quiet.
Daylight Operations: CT-28 was ordered by Division as follows: 28th Marines with 5th Tank Bn, and 3d Bn, 27th Marines, attached, will at K-hour (0830) pass through 27th Marines, seize O-2 and D-A in Division zone of action, be prepared to seize O-3 on order.
All three landing teams moved into the line abreast relieving three landing teams of CT-27. Relief was completed by 0850. Boundary between LT-128 and 228: 216 R northeast, M east, H east. Boundary between LT-328 and LT-228 216 K center, F center, A northwest. Boundary between LT-128 and CT-26; 217 P W center, K southwest, K northwest. Order of LT's from left to right: 328, 228,128. LT-327 was sent to assembly area in reserve in 199 K.
Hill 362 was the most formidable terrain feature confronting us. The hill provided enemy observation of the entire western side of the island and all the way south to SURIBACHI. It was rugged and rocky with no vegetation on the south, while on the north side was a sheer cliff about 80 feet high and dotted with many caves both large and small. This hill, or cliff line, extended in front of both LT-128 and LT-228. The attack was delayed 20 minutes in order to allow for completion of the relief of CT-27. Because of the extremely wide front, LT-128 was unable to relieve two companies of LT-326 which had been on the right of LT-327, and attached to CT-27. The attack moved slowly ahead under severe mortar and small arms fire. The same type of dogged enemy defense was encountered here as was encountered on SURIBACHI. By 1030, LT-128 and LT-228 had reached the top of 362 and the ridgeline running east and west from it, but were unable to negotiate the steep cliff on the north side because of heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Artillery, mortars, and rockets were concentrated in front of the hill but with little effect. At 1330, LT-128 committed its reserve company around the right side of the hill but was unable to contact LT-228, so the lines were consolidated for the night on the hill and ridgeline running east and west from it. C Co, 5th Tank Bn, was attached to LT-228 and also supported LT-128 and LT-328 by fire. Captain Wilkins, Commanding A Co, was killed during the day while leading his company against Hill 362. At 1700, H Co, of LT-327 was attached to LT-128 to back up its line for the night with orders to revert to LT-327 at 0730, 3 March. CP's; LT-128 in 199 B, LT-228 in 216 P, LT-328 in 198 C.
Combat efficiency: 65%